Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations by Ham, Willburt D.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 2 Article 1
1981
Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations
Willburt D. Ham
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ham, Willburt D. (1981) "Kentucky Law Survey: Corporations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 70 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol70/iss2/1
KENTUCKY LAW
SURVEY
Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
Since developments at the federal level continue to dominate
corporation law, the approach taken in the present Survey will
parallel that taken in previous Surveys.' A group of four federal
cases will be discussed first. Discussion of those cases will be fol-
lowed by analysis of four state court decisions, including two
cases decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The federal cases include a recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court involving the scope and application of sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, two decisions by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals involving actions brought under
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5, and a de-
cision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealing with the ef-
fect the presence of express civil liability provisions in the federal
securities acts has on actions brought under SEC rule 10b-5.
Developments in corporation law at the state level begin
with discussion of a decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware
involving application of the business judgment rule to the dismis-
sal of derivative actions. This will be followed by analysis of a de-
cision by the Supreme Court of Delaware dealing with the revoc-
ability of a shareholder's demand for the appraisal remedy in a
merger. The discussion will conclude with analysis of two recent
decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals involving the consti-
• Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of Ii-
nois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Corporations, 69 Ky. L.J. 453
(1980-81); Ham, Corporations, 68 Ky. L.J. 495 (1979-80); Ham, Corporations, 67 Ky.
L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham, Corporations, 66 KY. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Corporations,
65 Ky. L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Corporations, 64 KY. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Corpora-
tions, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1974-75).
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tutionality of the Kentucky Take-Over Act and the presence of a
registered office as a source of venue for suits against corpora-
tions in the Kentucky courts.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Stock Pledges
The federal securities acts contain a number of antifraud
provisions, one of which is section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933.2 This section broadly condemns fraudulent conduct in the
"offer or sale" of securities.3 Recently, in Rubin v. United States,4
the Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity to
consider whether the pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a
loan constitutes an "offer or sale" of a security within the mean-
ing of those terms as used in section 17(a).s
In the Rubin case, Rubin, after becoming vice-president of
Tri-State Energy, Inc., a corporation representing itself as en-
gaged in energy exploration and production but experiencing fi-
nancial problems, assisted Tri-State in obtaining loans totaling
$475,000 from Bankers Trust Co. 6 As security for the loans, Tri-
State pledged stocks represented to be worth approximately $1.7
2 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
3 The full text of § 17(a) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pur-
chaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
4 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
5 For another recent Supreme Court case interpreting the scope and application of
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act, see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979). In the Naf-
talin case, the Court upheld the conviction of Naftalin under a criminal indictment charg-
ing him with participating iii a fraudulent short-selling scheme against a group of brokers
in violation of § 17(a). The Court treated Naftalin's fraudulent conduct as occurring in the
"offer or sale" of securities as required by that section. 441 U.S. at 773.
6 449 U.S. at 425-26.
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million but which were in fact practically worthless. 7 Upon de-
fault by Tri-State in repaying the loans, Bankers Trust Co. sued
not only Tri-State but also Rubin personally as a guarantor of the
loans.8 The bank recovered only about $2,500, plus interest and
expenses.9 Rubin was then indicted for violating or conspiring to
violate several of the federal antifraud statutes, including section
17(a) of the Securities Act.' 0 He was convicted on the conspiracy
charges in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York." On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Rubin raised the question whether a pledge of
stock as collateral for a loan could be treated as an "offer or sale"
of a security under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, but the
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, reject-
ing Rubin's argument regarding the scope of section 17(a) with-
out comment.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting
review to the question whether a pledge of stock can be treated as
an "offer or sale" of that stock. 3
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held
that the pledges involved in the Rubin case constituted "offers"
or "sales" under section 17(a).14 Justice Burger considered this
conclusion to be consistent with the language of the Securities
Act, its legislative history, and its purpose. 5 As to the language of
the Act, Justice Burger referred to the broad manner in which
the terms "offer" and "sale" are defined in the Act.' 6 He noted
7 Id. at 426. Although the stocks were represented by Rubin as being "good, mark-
etable, and unrestricted," some of the shares were issued by "shell" companies, others
were "rented" or otherwise restricted, and Rubin arranged for fictitious quotations and
advertisements. Id. at 426-27.
8 Id. at 427.9
Id.
10 Id.
" Id. at 427-28.
12 Id. at 428 n.5.
13 445 U.S. 960 (1980).
14 449 U.S. at 431.
'5 Id. at 429-30. Rubin had argued that deposits of stock with a bank as collateral se-
curity for a loan could not be considered as constituting a transfer of title to the stocks at
that time, and that such a transfer of title could only occur by foreclosure of the pledges
after default on the loans. Id. at 429.
16 The terms "offer" and "sale" are defined by the Securities Act as follows:
The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposi-
1981-829.,
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the reference to the term "sale" as including not only every dispo-
sition of a security but also every disposition of an "interest in a
security,"' 17 and the term "offer" as including not only every offer
to dispose of a security but also every offer to dispose of an "inter-
est in a security."'" From this Justice Burger reasoned that "[uit is
not essential under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a
transferee for the transaction to be an 'offer' or a 'sale."'1 There-
fore, he concluded that "[alithough pledges transfer less than ab-
solute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an 'interest
in a security.' ,0
Turning to the legislative history of the Securities Act, Justice
Burger noted that Congress had taken the definition of "sale"
from the Uniform Sale of Securities Act,2' which had been con-
strued as embracing a pledge,22 and that there was no evidence
that Congress did not intend the broad scope thus given to the
definition of "sale."' Finally, Justice Burger indicated that he
felt such an interpretation of the term "sale" comported with the
purpose of the Securities Act whose "provisions were enacted to
protect against fraud and promote the free flow of information in
the public dissemination of securities." As he viewed the nature
tion of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell,"
"offer for sale," or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for
value.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
17 Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. at 429.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 430.
20 Id. at 429. To the argument made by Rubin that the implied power possessed by
pledgees to dispose of stock held by them could ripen into title only upon foreclosure of the
pledges, Justice Burger answered that it was enough that "[t]he pledges contemplated a
self-executing procedure under a power that could, at the option of the pledgee (the bank)
in the event of a default, vest absolute title and ownership." Id.
21 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HAND-
BOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39T ANNuAL CONFERENCE 174 (1929). The Uniform Sale
of Securities Act was approved for adoption in the several states by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1929.
It was an early attempt to provide a model "blue sky" statute for use by states in monitor-
ing the sale of securities within the state. In 1956, a new Uniform Securities Act was ap-
proved by the same two groups. See 7A U.L.A. 561 (1978).
2 See Cecil B. De Mille Prods., Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932).
23 Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. at 430.
24 Id. at 431.
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of pledges, "[t]he economic considerations and realities present
when a lender parts with value and accepts securities as collat-
eral security for a loan are similar in important respect to the risk
an investor undertakes when purchasing shares."2
These latter observations by Justice Burger as to the eco-
nomic realities of pledges may well give the Rubin decision an
importance beyond the context of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act, since a similar problem has arisen in connection with the
treatment of pledges as "sales" in actions brought under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,26 and SEC rule 10b-
5 promulgated thereunder.27 In 1977, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled, in Mallis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ,2
that a pledge of stock as collateral security for a loan could be
25 Id. In a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun, while concurring in the judgment
that a pledge of stock to a bank as collateral security for a loan should be treated as an "of-
fer or sale" under § 17(a), stated that he would reach such a conclusion more directly by
treating a pledge of stock as the "disposition" of a security rather than the "disposition of
an interest" in a security, as held by the majority of the Court. Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so reg-
istered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
2 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the subsequent disposition of
Ma//s, see the text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
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treated as a "purchase" and "sale" within the meaning of those
terms as used in the Exchange Act,2 remarking that "[a] pledge
which occurs pursuant to a loan contract is just as concrete a
transaction as is a normal transfer of title."' 0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Mallis case,3' but later, after oral argu-
ment, concluded that certiorari had been improvidently gran-
ted,3 2 thereby leaving the substantive issue undecided.3 Since the
Court in Rubin seemed to accept the economic argument as to
the nature of a pledge which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
voiced in Mallis, this suggests that the Court should likewise be
receptive to the treatment of pledges as "sales" within the context
of rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act.4
Such possible extension of the Court's reasoning is admittedly
left in some doubt by the emphasis which Justice Burger placed
on the words "interest in a security" in his opinion in Rubin,
since those words do not appear in the Exchange Act.-" There is
also the further problem of the restrictive interpretations which
the Supreme Court has been giving to section 10(b) and rule 10b-
29 568 F.2d at 830. But see National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co.,
583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978) (pledge of securities to secure a commercial bank loan is not
a "purchase" of a security within the meaning of the securities laws).
30 568 F.2d at 829.31 Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928 (1977).
12 Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
3 The change in the Court's attitude toward certiorari resulted when plaintiff, on
oral argument, urged a different theory for affirming the judgment of the court of appeals
and conceded that a pledge was not a sale. Id. at 388.
4 Such an extension of the Court's economic reasoning would appear to be
strengthened not only by the Court's citation to its opinion in the Naftalin case under the
Securities Act, but also by its citation to its opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976), under the Exchange Act, which it used as support for its statement in
Rubin that "[w]e frequently have observed that these provisions were enacted to protect
against fraud and promote the free flow of information in the public dissemination of se-
curities." 449 U.S. at 431. In the Hochfelder case, the Court imposed a scienter require-
ment for the maintenance of private damage suits under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
rule 10b-5.
35 The difficulty thus posed of adapting the reasoning of the Court to the Exchange
Act could be eliminated by emphasizing the language "disposition of a security" used in
the definition of "sale" in the Exchange Act rather than "disposition of an interest in a se-
curity," as Justice Blackmun did in his concurring opinion in Rubin. See note 25 supra for
a discussion of Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Rubin.
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5 since its decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,se
where it had spoken of "a straightforward application" of the re-
quirement that, for plaintiffs to have standing to bring civil ac-
tions for damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, such plain-
tiffs must be purchasers or sellers of a security. 37 The Rubin case,
of course, was a criminal action and not a civil action for
damages.3a
B. Reliance
Despite the restrictive interpretations given to section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 by the Supreme Court, litigation under these pro-
visions in the lower federal courts continues unabated. 39 In a re-
cent case considered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, Panzirer v. Wolf, 4° the court had occasion to look once
again at the proper role of "reliance" as a factor in private dam-
age suits under rule 10b-5.4'
In Panzirer, the plaintiff, Zelda Panzirer, had purchased
stock in Allied Artists Industries, Inc., after having read a favor-
able article on Allied which had appeared in the "Heard on the
Street" column of The Wall Street Journal.42 Plaintiff had first
3 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a review of this trend in Supreme Court decisions, see
Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pen-
dulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
37 421 U.S. at 755.
3 This may also explain the liberal attitude taken by the Court in Naftalin, which
involved a criminal prosecution under § 17(a) of the Securities Act. United States v. Naf-
talin, 441 U.S. 768. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he primary significance of
the ruling in Rubin would appear to be the Court's refusal to take a narrow view of the
scope of coverage of the securities acts," and that "[a]s was the case in Naftalin, the Court
is willing to continue the vitality, and perhaps even the expansion, of the antifraud rem-
edies, at least when applied in the appropriate context." Hazen, Symposium Introduc-
tion-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30
EMORY L.J. 5, 21 (1981).
39 It has been pointed out that "even in its most recent limiting decisions, the [Su-
preme] Court bypassed the opportunities to foreclose the expansive readings that have
flourished in the circuit courts and that seem certain to continue." Hazen, supra note 38,
at 34.
40 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3998.09 (U.S. June 28,
1982) (No. 81-1998).
41 For an earlier decision in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion
to consider the element of "reliance" in the context of impersonal market transactions, see
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
*42 663 F.2d at 366. The column, which in that particular day's issue of The Wall
1981-821]
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNALo
contacted her broker, Michael Blum, at the local office of the
E.F. Hutton brokerage firm to ascertain whether there was any
negative news about Allied. 4 Blum, relying on a tear sheet from
Standard & Poor, had reported no negative news. 44 Standard &
Poor's tear sheet had abstracted information from Allied's annual
report, which "allegedly contained numerous misrepresentations
and omissions."4 5 Although plaintiff admitted she had never seen
the annual report and could not therefore have relied directly on
the misrepresentations and omissions contained in the report, she
claimed that the report had affected the market in Allied stock
and that she had relied indirectly on the report through her reli-
ance on the integrity of the market.48 When Allied filed a petition
in bankruptcy, plaintiff sued Allied officers and Allied's accoun-
tant, Price Waterhouse & Co., in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. 47 The district court granted summary judgment
against plaintiff, reasoning that plaintiff had relied primarily on
the Wall Street Journal article in making her purchases and only
secondarily on the integrity of the market,48 and finding that sec-
ondary reliance was insufficient to support a rule 10b-5 claim.49
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the district court,5° stating that it could not find any support in
Street Journal covered the video cassette market, had stated that several analysts were of
the opinion that Allied was in a good position to take advantage of the growing video tapes
market. Id.
43 Id.
44Id.
4' Id. The principal misrepresentation related to a report of profits for the previous
fiscal year. In fact, Allied had to split certain receipts from a film it had made, Allied had
actually lost money during the fiscal year. The principal omission related to a failure of
the annual report to reveal a qualification by Allied's accountants, Price Waterhouse &
Co., to their certification of Allied's financial statements that they doubted Allied's ability
to function as a going concern. Id.
'6 Id. at 367. Plaintiff argued that "if Allied's report had been accurate, the stock
analysts interviewed by the Journal would not have mentioned the company favorably,
the Journal would not have devoted two paragraphs to Allied's prospects in the video cas-
sette market, and plaintiff would not have been led by the article to buy her stock." Id.
47 Id. at 366.
48 Id. at 367.
'9 Id. The district court also denied a request by plaintiff that she be allowed to rep-
resent the class of investors who purchased Allied stock after release of the annual report.
Id. at 366.
50 Id. at 366.
[Vol. 70
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the law for drawing a distinction between primary and secon-
dary reliance.5' As viewed by the court of appeals, the reliance
requirement in rule lOb-5 cases is a means of confirming that the
plaintiff's injury was "caused" by the alleged fraud, 52 but, as the
court noted, "[p]roving reliance is necessarily difficult where the
fraud has affected the market and damaged the plaintiff only
through its effect on the market." Pointing out that the Second
Circuit,5 as well as other circuits,-I had dispensed with the re-
quirement of direct reliance where investors had relied on the in-
tegrity of the market price of stocks,," the court reasoned that the
same position was justified in cases such as the one before it in
which the plaintiff, while not relying on the integrity of the mar-
ket price, did rely on the integrity of the market as reported in
The Wall Street Journal. 57 As the court remarked, "[jiust as a ma-
terial misrepresentation or omission is presumed to affect the
price of the stock, so it should be presumed to affect the informa-
tion 'heard on the street' which led Zelda Panzirer to make her
losing investment."' Therefore, the court concluded, "[p]laintiff
has on this record stated a sufficient connection between her loss
and the allegedly fraudulent annual report to withstand a motion
for summary judgment."' 9
In extending the "presumption of reliance" approach to cases
involving "secondary reliance," where a requirement of direct
proof of reliance would impose a difficult evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs, e° the Second Circuit Court of Appeals would appear to
51 Id. at 367. The court, however, affirmed the denial of class certification, stating
that the district court had acted well within its discretion in concluding that plaintiff
lacked sufficient credibility to be a fit class representative in view of her conflicting ver-
sions of her conversation with her broker. Id. at 368.
52 1d. at 367. For a discussion of the concept of causation in rule 10b-5 litigation and
the role reliance plays in establishing causation, see Crane, An Analysis of Causation Un-
derRule lOb-5, 9 SEC. BEG. L.J. 99 (1981).
5 663 F.2d at 368.
54 See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980).
,4 See Blacde v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976).
W 663 F.2d at 368.
57 1d.
5
8ld.
59 Id. at 367.
0 In this regard, see the comments by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Blackie
1981-821
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have reached a result consistent with the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in its decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States.61 In Affiliated Ute, the Court adopted a presumption of
reliance approach to establishing proof of "transaction" causa-
tion in cases involving failure to disclose material information.A5
C. Insider Trading
As last year's Survey pointed out, one of the most significant
recent decisions handed down by the Supreme Court under the
securities laws was Chiarella v. United States,6 in which the
Court rejected the position that trading on nonpublic market in-
formation could constitute a violation of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.61 The fallout from this decision is now beginning to be felt
as evidenced by the recent decision of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Newman. 6 In the Newman case,
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, as to imposing a requirement of direct proof of reliance on in-
vestors who had purchased stock in a publicly held company whose stock was claimed to
have been inflated as a result of misleading annual and interim reports, press releases and
SEC filings about the financial condition of the company. The court remarked:
Direct proof would inevitably be somewhat pro forma, and impose a diffi-
cult evidentiary burden, because addressed to a speculative possibility in an
area where motivations are complex and difficult to determine.... Here,
the requirement is redundant-the same causal nexus can be adequately es-
tablished indirectly, by proof of materiality coupled with the common sense
that a stock purchaser does not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form
of artificially inflated stock.
Id. at 908.
61 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
6 2 Id. at 153-54. Affiliated Ute involved a complaint charging market manipulation.
The Supreme Court remarked:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of this deci-
sion .... This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact
establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
Id.
6 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
64 For a discussion of the Chiarella decision and its implications for insider trading,
see Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 1Ob-5 and Insider
Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981).
6' 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
1981-82] SURVEY-CORPORATIONS
the court was called upon to determine whether a criminal in-
dictment charging employees of an investment banking firm and
a securities trader with misappropriation of confidential takeover
information could be sustained in view of the Chiarella deci-
sion. 6
The indictment in Newman charged that two individuals,
Courtois and Antoniu, employees of the investment banking
firms of Morgan Stanley & Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co.,67 during a
period between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 1978, had
misappropriated confidential information concerning proposed
mergers and acquisitions entrusted to their employers and had
surreptitiously conveyed this information to Newman, a secur-
ities trader, who, with' two confederates, purchased stock in
companies targeted for takeover.6 It was charged that they all
had then shared in the profits reaped when the market price of
the stocks in the target companies rose after the mergers or take-
overs were announced.69
The facts in Newman paralleled closely those in Chiarella,
where Chiarella, a mark-up man in a printing establishment,
after deciphering the names of acquiring and target companies in
takeover bids from copy submitted by clients to his employer for
printing, purchased stock in the target companies before final
printing and then, after the takeover bids were publicly an-
nounced, sold the stock at a profit. 70 In Newman, however, the
Government framed its indictment on a different theory than
66 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York did not be-
lieve the indictment could be sustained against Newman under Chiarella, stating:
In the case at bar, it could not be alleged that Newman was a corpo-
rate insider acting on inside information. Rather, he was a peripheral fig-
ure, privy by virtue of the conspiracy to "market information"-that is to
say, "information about events or circumstances which affect the market for
a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earn-
ing power," and which emanates from sources other than that company.
United States v. Courtos, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at
91,291 (S.D.N.Y. June 5,1981), rev'd, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
67 The two investment banking firms involved in the alleged conspiracy, Morgan
Stanley & Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co., have since joined to become Lehman Brothers
Kuhn Loeb, Inc. 664 F.2d at 15.
6 Id.
69 id.
70 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 224.
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that which it had used in Chiarella in an effort to avoid the defi-
ciency which led to the reversal of Chiarella's conviction. 7' The
indictment against Chiarella had been framed on the theory that
Chiarella had violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by failing to
disclose material, nonpublic market information to the pur-
chasers from whom he purchased stock.72 The Supreme Court re-
jected this theory of insider trading as too broad and adopted the
position that actionable fraud based on nondisclosure under sec-
tion 10(b) exists only where there is "a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction," 73 a relationship which it did not find to exist in the
Chiarella case.74
In his opinion written for a majority of the Court in Chia-
rella, Justice Powell referred to an alternative theory which had
been offered by the Government to support Chiarella's convic-
tion: the argument that Chiarella had committed actionable
fraud under section 10(b) by breaching a duty owed to the ac-
quiring corporations not to misuse confidential information sub-
mitted by those corporations to his employer.75 Justice Powell re-
fused to consider the merits of this approach in Chiarella because
the jury had not been instructed on such a theory. 76 In Newman,
the Government framed the indictment on this basis, charging
that Courtois and Antoniu had breached the trust and confi-
dence placed in them by their employers and their employers'
71 See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15.
7,2 445 U.S. at 225.
73 Id. at 230.
74 Speaking of the need for the existence of a "duty to disclose" and applying it to
Chiarella, who had petitioned the Court from his conviction in the lower federal courts,
the Court remarked:
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the tar-
get company's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He
was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the
sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market trans-
actions.
Id. at 232-33.
75 Id. at 235-36.
76 Id. In refusing to consider the Government's alternative theory, Justice Powell
said: "[W]e will not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been
breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 10(b)." Id. at 236-37.
[VCol. 70
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clients and charging Newman, along with his confederates, wiih
facilitating Courtois and Antoniu in violating those fiduciary
duties.1 Justice Stevens, concurring in Chiarella, recognized the
possible merits of such a theory, but pointed out the additional
barrier to recognition of the theory resulting from the purchaser-
seller standing requirement imposed on plaintiffs in section 10(b)
suits by the Supreme Court in the Blue Chip Stamps case. 78 As he
noted, if the employer's clients would not be able to recover dam-
ages for violations of rule lOb-5 because they were neither pur-
chasers nor sellers of the target company securities, then it could
be argued that there was no actionable violation of rule 10b-5.79
Referring to the differences between a criminal action under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and a private civil suit,80 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Newman considered that the alleged
conduct "could be found to constitute a criminal violation of sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 despite the fact that neither Morgan
Stanley, Kuhn Loeb nor their clients was at the time a purchaser
or seller of the target company securities in any transaction with
any of the defendants." 81 In the court's view, the standing re-
quirement is irrelevant to criminal suits under rule 10b-5, and
thus the real issue becomes whether the alleged fraudulent con-
duct can be said to have occurred "in connection with" the pur-
chase or sale of securities as required by the section and the rule. 82
77 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15-16. The indictment named Newman,
Courtois, and the confederates of Newman as defendants, but only Newman was within
the jurisdiction of the district court. The other alleged co-conspirator, Antoniu, was not
indicted. Id. at 15.
78 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
79 Id.
80 As the court pointed out, the purchaser-seller standing requirement is a judicial
creation designed to place boundaries on the scope of implied civil suits for damages under
S 10(b) and is not relevant to governmental actions brought either under § 21 of the Ex-
change Act, which empowers the SEC to bring injunctive suits, or § 32 of the Exchange
Act, which provides criminal penalties for willful violations of the Act or the rules promul-
gated thereunder. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
81 Id. at 16.
82 Id. at 18. The court remarked:
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to engage in any act or
practice which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." When litigation under this Rule is
instituted by the SEC under section 21 or by a United States Attorney under
1981-82]
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Using the flexible test adopted by the Supreme Court in Superin-
tendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,8 in which
the Court construed the phrase "in connection with" as including
practices "touching" the sale of securities, 84 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals had little difficulty finding the necessary "con-
nection" between the misappropriation of the confidential infor-
mation and the purchase of the shares of stock by the defendants
in Newman.
While it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will
accept the reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as to
criminal actions involving insider trading under section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, the Newman decision should, in the meantime,
lend encouragement to the continuing efforts of the Securities
and Exchange Commission to police the evils of insider trading.8 6
At least, as one commentator put it, "[r]ecognition of the correct
reasons for restricting the rule lOb-5 insider trading prohibition
as well as current SEC efforts to enforce the rule may prompt the
reevaluation necessary to produce a more efficient and just ap-
proach to the insider trading problem." 87
section 32, the court's concern must be with the scope of the Rule, not plain-
tiffs standing to sue.
Id. at 16-17.
83 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
84 Id. at 12.
8 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18. The court also held that the conduct of
Newman and his co-conspirators could be considered a violation of the federal mail fraud
statute, as had been charged in the indictment. Id. at 19-20.
86 In a separate opinion, Judge Dumbauld concurred in treating the fraudulent ac-
tivities of Newman and his confederates as constituting possible violations of the mail
fraud statute, but dissented from the position of the majority of the court that defendant's
activities could be treated as violative of § 10(b) in view of what he considered to be the
trend in Supreme Court decisions "to confine the scope of § 10(b) to practices harmful to
participants in actual purchase-sale transactions." Id. at 20 (Dumbauld, J., concurring
and dissenting).
87 Branson, supra note 64, at 264. After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Chiarella, the SEC adopted rule 14e-3 to coinbat insider trading in transactions of the
type engaged in by Chiarella and Newman. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). Rule 14e-3 was
adopted by the SEC pursuant to § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which broadly condemns
fraudulent practices "in connection with tender offers." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). How-
ever, it has been noted that
the legal underpinning for the application of 14e-3 to Chiarella-type activity
is, to say the least, doubtful, and it is difficult to construe section 14(e) in any
way that overrules the Supreme Court's holding that any information can be
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D. Civil Liability
A problem under the federal securities laws which has
plagued the lower federal courts for many years has been whe-
ther to recognize an implied private cause of action for fraud-
ulent conduct under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 when an ex-
press civil remedy is available under other provisions of the secur-
ities laws for the conduct involved. 8 This issue surfaced recently
in the Fifth Circuit case of Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,89
involving alleged misrepresentations contained in a prospectus.8
In that case, Texas International Speedway, Inc. filed a reg-
istration statement and prospectus with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission for the sale of $4,398,800 of securities, the
proceeds to be used to construct an automobile racetrack. 91 Al-
though the company was successful in selling the entire offer-
ing,9" a year later the company had filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy.93 Subsequently, purchasers of the company's securities
filed a class action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, alleging
that the prospectus contained misleading statements.9 4 Damages
were sought from the former president of the company, who was
also the treasurer as well as a director of the company; from the
former executive vice-president of the company, who was also a
director of the company; and from the accountants for the com-
pany who had participated in preparation of the prospectus.95
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury on the issue
whether the prospectus was materially misleading and, if so,
used by anyone who has no duty to speak in respect of the target company or
its shareholders.
Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus.
LAW. 517, 546 (1982).
88 See Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization
Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DuKE L.J. 928.
89 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
90 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the public sale and distribution of
securities through the mails or channels of interstate commerce unless a registration state-
ment has been filed with the SEC as to such securities and a prospectus furnished to the
purchasers of the securities at or before the sale or distribution. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
91 Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 539.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94Id
.
95 Id.
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whether scienter was present.96 The jury found the prospectus
misleading and the defendants were found to have acted "with
reckless disregard for the truth." 7 The trial judge entered judg-
ment for plaintiffs after he determined the prnount of the dam-
ages.
98
The threshold question considered by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit
of an implied private cause of action under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 when the alleged misrepresentations n the prospectus
would have justified a suit under sections 119 and 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.100 The court acknowledged that prior to the
recent Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope of the Se-
curities Acts, there appeared to have been general agreement
among commentators and the lower federal courts that rule 10b-
5 actions were not necessarily precluded by the express civil li-
ability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 101 However, as the
court remarked, "recent Supreme Court decisions curtailing the
broader sweep given the Securities Acts by lower federal
courts... give substance to the argument that no remedy
should be implied for actions covered by the express liability pro-
visions of the statutes."'02 Noting, however, the fact that two cir-
cuit courts had recently addressed the question and had held that
a cause of action could be implied in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
despite the possibility of overlap with express remedies provided
by other sections of the securities laws,' o the court concluded
98 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 540.
99 Section 11 provides that a private civil action for damages may be brought by any
person who acquired a security for which a registration statement had been filed contain-
ing material omissions or misstatements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
100 Section 12(2) makes any person who offers or sells a security by means of a pro-
spectus or oral communication which includes any material omission or misstatement li-
able to the person purchasing such security from him provided the purchaser was unaware
of such misstatements or omissions and provided the person offering or selling the security
fails to sustain the burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known of the misstatements or omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 77(0(2) (1976).
101 Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 542 n.7.
102 Id. at 541-42.
'01 Id. at 542. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545.
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that the plaintiffs in Huddleston should be permitted to maintain
a suit under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "even if the deceit that
is the basis for the Section 10(b) action may also be actionable
under other express liability provisions of the securities law."'' °4
This decision, coupled with the other recent decisions re-
ferred to by the court, would suggest that the longstanding as-
sumption that implied causes of action under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 are not necessarily affected by the presence of overlap-
ping express civil liability provisions in the securities laws will re-
main unimpaired absent a contrary determination by the Su-
preme Court. 105 Nevertheless, it appears the lower federal courts
will need to proceed with some degree of caution in recognizing
implied rights of action under the federal securities laws in view
of expressions by the Supreme Court in its recent opinions that
extensions of the implied remedy must not be allowed to nullify
the carefully drawn restrictions on express actions imposed by
Congress. 106 As one commentator has indicated, "even when an
104 640 F.2d at 543.
10 It is significant that in the first case which the Supreme Court considered involv-
ing rule 10b-5, SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court recog-
nized the overlapping nature of the various provisions in the federal securities laws. In that
case, the SEC charged National Securities, Inc. with violation of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in
having solicited shareholder approval of a merger through misleading proxy material. Na-
tional Securities, Inc. contended that rule 10b-5 should not be considered applicable to
misrepresentations in connection with the solicitation of proxies. To this argument the
Court replied:
Respondents' alternative argument that Rule lOb-5 does not cover mis-
representations which occur in connection with proxy solicitations can be
dismissed rather quickly.... [Tihe existence or nonexistence of regulation
under § 14 would not affect the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The two
sections of the Act apply to different sets of situations. Section 10(b) applies
to all proscribed conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of any secur-
ity; § 14 applies to all proxy solicitations, whether or not in connection with
a purchase or sale. The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither
unusual nor unfortunate.
393 U.S. at 468.
10O See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Supreme Court, in holding that § 17(a) of the Ex-
change Act (which imposes certain record-keeping requirements on broker-dealers) did
not create a private cause of action in view of the presence of an express civil liability pro-
vision in § 18(a) of the Exchange Act, commented that "we are extremely reluctant to im-
ply a cause of action in § 17(a) that is significantly broader than the remedy that Congress
chose to provide." Id. at 574.
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implied private action is deemed necessary to effectuate the legis-
lative purpose, courts must first consider the impact the implied
action will have upon those rights of action expressly included in
the statutory scheme,"' 1 because "[a]n important aspect of this
recent restrictive attitude is the Court's policy that implied ac-
tions must be harmonized with those causes of action expressly
provided by the federal act."1
II. STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Business Judgment Rule
Perhaps the state court case which has attracted the most at-
tention recently is Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, °9 involving ap-
plication of the business judgment rule to the dismissal of share-
holder derivative suits. 110 The importance of state law in this area
was underscored by the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Burks v. Lasker. "' In that case, a group of.disin-
terested directors of an investment company determined that a
shareholders' derivative suit brought against other directors of
the company for violations of federal law should be dismissed in
the best interest of the shareholders of the company." 2 The Su-
preme Court held that the action of the disinterested directors
should be sustained if the governing state law permitted disinter-
107 Comment, supra note 88, at 928-29.
'o8 Id. at 928.
'0' 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
110 The "business judgment rule" is a judicial creation designed to insulate directors
and officers from liability for losses resulting from mere errors of judgment as distin-
guished from negligence in the performance of their duties. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS § 242 (2d ed. 1970). The rule has its origins in the provisions of state corporation
statutes that place management of corporate affairs in a board of directors. See, e.g., KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A. 175 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. Referring to
§ 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which states that the business and af-
fairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
the Delaware Supreme Court, in Maldonado, remarked that "[t]he judicial creation and
legislative grant are related because the 'business judgment' rule evolved to give recogni-
tion and deference to directors' business expertise when exercising their managerial power
under § 141(a)." 430 A.2d at 782.
111 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
112 The directors of the investment company, along with its investment adviser, were
charged with having violated their fiduciary duties under the Investment Company Act
and the Investment Advisers Act. Id. at 473 n.3.
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ested directors to terminate derivative suits and if the state rule
did not infringe on the policies of federal law.113 Thus, under
Burks, even in cases involving federal statutes, the primacy of
state law controls initially in arriving at the determination of the
power of corporate directors to monitor shareholder litigation. "4
In Maldonado, William Maldonado, a shareholder of Zapata
Corporation, brought a derivative action in the Court of Chan-
cery of Delaware on behalf of Zapata against its officers and di-
rectors charging breaches of fiduciary duty. ",5 Later, the board of
directors of Zapata created a special investigation committee,
composed solely of two newly appointed independent outside di-
rectors, to investigate whether the chancery action and two other
similar derivative actions should be continued."6 The committee
determined that all the actions should be dismissed as not being
in the best interests of the company." 7 The company thereupon
moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the three derivative
13 Id. at 480.
114 Following the decision in Burks, and prior to the advent of the Maldonado litiga-
tion, there had been a strong tendency in the lower federal courts to assume Delaware law
would apply the "business judgment rule" to derivative suits. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
15 Maldonado did not make any appeal to the board of directors of Zapata to bring
the suit, as required by Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 in Delaware, contending that such a
demand would have been futile since the directors as defendants allegedly participated in
the wrongdoing. 430 A.2d at 779. Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 states, in part, as to com-
plaints filed in derivative suits: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the ef-
forts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort." DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. For a similar provision in the Kentucky Business Corpo-
ration Act, see KRS § 271A.245 (1981).
16 One such action was brought by Maldonado in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York alleging claims under the federal securities laws as
well as the common law claims made in the previous court of chancery action in Del-
aware. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 780. The federal district court
granted a motion by Zapata for summary judgment. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). That decision was appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, after the Supreme Court of Delaware accepted an appeal from the decision of
the Delaware Court of Chancery in the original Maldonado action dismissing Maldon-
ado's suit, the Second Circuit appeal was stayed pending resolution of the appeal in the
Delaware action. See 430 A.2d at 781. In the meantime, a third action had been brought
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where the court had
denied a motion by Zapata either to dismiss or to grant summary judgment. Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
"17 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 781.
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actions."" The court of chancery denied Zapata's motions, 9 tak-
ing the position that the business judgment rule does not extend
to the dismissal of derivative actions.12 The court referred to the
business judgment rule as a defensive rule designed to protect di-
rectors in the exercise of their managerial decisions,' 2 1 not a
weapon to be used affirmatively to permit directors to compel
dismissal of derivative suits brought as a matter of right by share-
holders to rectify alleged wrongs done to the corporation and its
shareholders after refusal of the directors to bring suit. 12
In contrast with the decision reached by the Delaware Court
of Chancery in Maldonado, the Court of Appeals of New York,
just a year previously, had held in Auerbach v. Bennett'2 that the
118 Id.
119 Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). Later, however, the court
of chancery dismissed Maldonado's cause of action on principles of res judicata resulting
from the decision of the New York federal district court in Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274, but conditioned that disposition on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firming the district court decision. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980).
This left Maldonado in a stalemate unless the Supreme Court of Delaware acted on the ap-
peal which it had accepted in the original Maldonado action, inducing the Supreme Court
of Delaware to remark in the Maldonado case: "Thus, Zapata's observation that it sits 'in a
procedural gridlock" appears quite acurate, and we agree that this Court can and should
attempt to resolve the particular question of Delaware law." Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d at 781.
120 413 A.2d at 1257. The court said:
Under settled Delaware law the directors do not have the right to compel
the dismissal of a derivative suit brought by a stockholder to rectify an ap-
parent breach of fiduciary duty by the directors to the corporation and its
stockholders after the directors have refused to institute legal proceedings,
because the stockholder then possesses an independent right to redress the
wrong.
Id. at 1262.
121 Id. at 1256. The court remarked as to the business judgment rule:
It provides a shield with which directors may oppose stockholders' attacks on
the decisions made by them; but nothing in it grants any independent power
to a corporate board of directors to terminate a derivative suit. The author-
ity to terminate a derivative suit must be found-if at all-outside the rule.
Id. at 1257.
12 Id. at 1262. The court added:
Under our system of law, courts and not litigants should decide the
merits of litigation. Aggrieved stockholders of Delaware corporations ought
to be able to expect that an impartial tribunal, and not a committee, ap-
pointed by the alleged wrongdoers, will decide whether a stockholder's de-
rivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty has any merit.
Id. at 1263.
123 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
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business judgment rule applied to the dismissal of a derivative
suit at the direction of a special litigation committee of the board
of directors provided the members of the committee making the
decision were found to be truly disinterested and independent. 
24
The Supreme Court of Delaware in Maldonado, while agreeing
with the general theory that the business judgment of indepen-
dent directors as to the termination of derivative litigation right-
fully brought by shareholders should be given weight, neverthe-
less expressed concern at an unfettered application of the bus-
iness judgment rule to the derivative litigation cases.ls 5 What is
needed, reasoned the court, is "a balancing point where bona
fide stockholder power to bring corporate causes of action cannot
be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the corpo-
ration can rid itself of detrimental litigation."'2 6
To achieve this balanced approach, the court recommended
that a two-step test be used'-* and remanded the case to the court
of chancery for further proceedings consistent with such an ap-
proach.'4 First, the supreme court said, the court of chancery
124 Id. at 1001.
125 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d at 787. The court conceded that, consis-
tent with requiring the shareholder to make a demand on the board of directors before in-
stituting a derivative suit, "a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as
detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be respected
unless it was wrongful." Id. at 784. So, the court added, "[a] demand, when required and
refused (if not wrongful), terminates a stockholder's legal ability to initiate a derivative ac-
tion. But where demand is properly excused, the stockholder does possess the ability to ini-
tiate the action on his corporation's behalf." Id. The question then becomes, according to
the court, "[w]hen, if at all, should an authorized board committee be permitted to cause
litigation, properly initiated by a derivative stockholder in his own right, to be dismissed?"
Id. at 785.
124 Id. at 787. As the court suggested:
If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently wrest bona fide derivative
actions away from well-meaning derivative plaintiffs through the use of the
committee mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of its
generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate means of policing
boards of directors.... If, on the other hand, corporations are unable to
rid themselves of meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits, the deriv-
ative action, created to benefit the corporation, will produce the opposite,
unintended result.
Id. at 786-87.
2't Id. at 788.
12 Id. at 789.
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should inquire into the independence and good faith of the board
committee and should analyze the basis used by the committee in
reaching its conclusion to order dismissal of the derivative suit. '
Then, as a second step, the court of chancery should apply its
own independent business judgment to whether the corpora-
tion's best interests are being served by having the suit dis-
missed."1° This second step, according to the supreme court,
would be designed to "thwart instances where corporate actions
meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to sat-
isfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prema-
turely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further
consideration in the corporation's interest."'31
The merits of this compromise position adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Delaware in Maldonado-a compromise be-
tween outright rejection of the business judgment rule in deriv-
ative litigation and its absolute application to such litigation-
will no doubt be questioned by some as undesirable or unrealistic
insofar as it allows the business judgment of a court to override
the business judgment of the board of directors.1 3Nevertheless,
if followed, it should serve to alleviate some of the concern ex-
pressed after the Burks case that the Burks decision would consti-
12 Id. at 788-789.
130 Id. at 789.
131 Id. To this statement the court added: "The Court of Chancery of course must
carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate interest in dismissal is when
faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should, when appropriate,
give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corpora-
tion's best interests." Id.
132 Compare, for example, the observations made by the New York Court of Appeals
inAuerbach:
It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is
grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infre-
quently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judg-
ments. The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate directors both
by statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably
there can be no available objective standard by which the correctness of
every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise. Even
if that were not the case, by definition the responsibility for business judg-
ments must rest with the corporate directors; their individual capabilities
and experience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that responsibil-
ity. Thus, absent evidence of bad faith or fraud (of which there is none here)
the courts must and properly should respect their determinations.
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d at 1000.
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tute an "instrument of death" for shareholders' derivative ac-
tions. 3 As has been perceptively observed, "the Zapata decision
ushers in a new era in the eternal warfare between the corpora-
tion and the derivative plaintiff,"' 13 and "[tlhe only safe conclu-
sion is that the next few years will witness decisive developments
in the field of derivative actions."'' 3
B. Appraisal Remedy
Another recent case of interest decided by the Supreme Court
of Delaware was Dofflemyer v. W.F. Hall Printing Co.,"' in-
volving the right of dissenting shareholders in a corporate merger
to withdraw their demand for appraisal of their stock. 37 Robert
and Josephine Dofflemyer were owners of 700 shares of common
stock in W.F. Hall Printing Co., which was merged into Mobil-
Hall Corporation. 38 Under the terms of the merger, the Hall
common stockholders were to be paid $27.50 in cash for each
share of Hall stock.139 The Dofflemyers objected to the merger
and filed a petition in the Court of Chancery of Delaware for ap-
praisal of their stock pursuant to the provisions of the Delaware
appraisal statute. 0
Subsequently, the Dofflemyers filed another action in the
Delaware Court of Chancery seeking to have the merger set aside
133 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 530, A-16 (Nov. 28, 1979) (report of panel discus-
sion at Practicing Law Institutes Eleventh Annual Institute on Securities Regulation).
134 Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Viva ZapataP, 37 Bus. LAw. 27, 75 (1981).
135 Id.
136 432 A.2d 1198 (Del. 1981).
137 The appraisal remedy is a right given to dissenting shareholders in certain types
of fundamental corporate changes to have the corporation pay them the fair cash value of
their stock. See H. HENN, supra note 110, at § 349. For applicable Kentucky statutory pro-
visions, see KRS §§ 271A.400-.405 (1981).
138 432 A.2d at 1199.
139 Id.
140 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980). The provisions of § 262
of the Delaware General Corporation Law were revised, effective July 6, 1981, but the re-
vision did not change the appraisal requirements involved in the Dofflemyer case. For a
discussion of the changes made in the appraisal provisions, see Black & Sparks, Analysis of
the 1981 Amendments to the Delaware Corporation Law, [1981] 2 CORP. (Del.) [P-H]
311,315-18.
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on the ground that the merger was fraudulent and unlawful.141
They then on three separate occasions sought by motion to have
the court stay the appraisal proceeding pending a determination
of their rights in the merger action, but these motions were de-
nied.142 Just prior to the hearing date set for the appraisal pro-
ceeding, the Dofflemyers filed a motion to dismiss the appraisal
action, alleging that their primary desire was to pursue the mer-
ger action. 143 The court denied the Dofflemyers' motion to dis-
miss. 44 The Dofflemyers appealed 4e denial of their motion.145
The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the decision of the
court of chancery, holding that the Dofflemyers' election to de-
mand appraisal was irrevocable under the Delaware appraisal
statute absent the consent of the corporation. 146 The supreme
court pointed out that, under the Delaware appraisal statute,
once a dissenting shareholder has demanded appraisal he loses
the incidents of stock ownership and can regain those incidents
only by adhering strictly to the conditions prescribed by the ap-
praisal statute. 147 Under the provisions of the Delaware statute, a
shareholder is given the right to withdraw his demand for ap-
praisal if he seeks such withdrawal within sixty days after the ef-
fective date of the merger.148 If he waits a longer period, then he
must secure the written approval of the corporation for with-
141 432 A.2d at 1199.
14 2 Id. In one of the motions, the Dofflemyers sought in the alternative to consolidate
the appraisal action with the merger action, but this was likewise denied. Id.
143 Id. at 1200.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1202.
147 Id. at 1201-02.
148 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980). This provision
reads:
Within 120 days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation,
the corporation or any stockholder who has complied with subsections (a)
and (b) of this section and who is otherwise entitled to appraisal rights under
this section may file a petition in the Court of Chancery demanding a deter-
mination of the value of the stock of all such stockholders. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, at any time within 60 days after the effective date of the mer-
ger or consolidation, any stockholder shall have the right to withdraw his
demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered upon the merger or
consolidation.
[Vol. 70
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drawal., 9 The Dofflemyers had filed their petition for appraisal
113 days after the effective date of the merger, which was within
the 120-day limit prescribed by the Delaware statute, but at a
time which placed them outside the 60-day cutoff period for
withdrawal.1s0 According to the court, a shareholder, after the
60-day cutoff period, could not "withdraw from an appraisal
and resume the rights to which he would have been entitled as a
shareholder, without the written approval of the corporation."'51
The court rejected an argument by the Dofflemyers that the pro-
visions for cutoff in the appraisal statute should be construed as
applicable only to stock-for-stock mergers and not cash-for-stock
mergers, stating that it could find no indication of legislative in-
tent to limit the statutory restrictions only to stock-for-stock mer-
gers. 52
Although the specific provisions in corporation statutes per-
taining to the appraisal remedy differ somewhat from state to
149 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980). This provision
states in part:
[1]f no petition for an appraisal shall be filed within the time provided in
subsection (c) of this section, or if such stockholder shall deliver to the corpo-
ration a written withdrawal of his demand for an appraisal and acceptance
of the merger or consolidation, either within 60 days after the effective date
of the merger or consolidation as provided in subsection (c) of this section or
thereafter with the written approval of the corporation, then the right of
such stockholder to appraisal shall cease.
Id. (emphasis added).
150 432 A.2d at 1200.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1202. The court commented that, as it had observed in a previous opinion
dealing with a predecessor Delaware appraisal statute, one of the principal purposes be-
hind provisions in appraisal statutes defining shareholder status after a demand for ap-
praisal had been made "was to settle the troublesome issue of who possessed the incidents
of stock ownership after the dissenter demanded appraisal, but before the appraisal
award." Id. The appraisal provisions applicable in Dofflemyer, as set forth in § 262(i) of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, state:
Any stockholder who has demanded his appraisal rights as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section shall thereafter neither be entitled to vote such
stock for any purpose nor be entitled to the payment of dividends or other
distribution on the stock (except dividends or other distributions payable to
stockholders of record at a date which is prior to the effective date of the
merger or consolidation) ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(i) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1980). The court remarked in Doffle-
myer that "[t]his problem presents itself in both stock-for-stock and cash-for-stock mer-
gers." 432 A.2d at 1202.
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state, the statutes uniformly contain detailed requirements
which a shareholder must follow to perfect the appraisal remedy
or to withdraw a demand for appraisal once made.1 0 Further-
more, the courts have customarily given a strict and literal con-
struction to appraisal statutes.' 3 The attitude of the Supreme
Court of Delaware in Dofflemyer reflects this strict construction
and emphasizes once again the need for shareholders availing
themselves of the appraisal remedy in corporate mergers, or
other transactions in which the appraisal remedy is made avail-
able, to exercise the utmost care to familiarize themselves with
the specific requirements of the applicable appraisal statute-not
only as to perfecting but also as to withdrawing their demand for
appraisal.5 3
C. Tender Offers
Turning to recent Kentucky cases of interest, perhaps the
most notable is the decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Esmark, Inc. v. Strode,156 upholding the constitutionality of the
Kentucky Take-Over Act.'57 This decision takes on added signif-
icance in light of the fact that the constitutionality of takeover
153 See, e.g., KRS § 271A.405 (1981). Under the Kentucky appraisal statute a share-
holder cannot withdraw a demand for appraisal once made without the consent of the
corporation. KRS § 271A.405(2) (1981).
154 See, e.g., F.S. Moseley & Co. v. Midland-Ross Corp., 179 A.2d 295 (Del. 1962).
The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the requirement imposed by Delaware law
that a shareholder seeking the appraisal remedy file a written objection to the proposed
corporate action was not satisfied by either a letter of transmittal enclosing a proxy form
containing a vote against a merger or the proxy itself. Id. at 296-97.
1' This, of course, assumes that shareholders are properly informed as to the nature
of their appraisal rights and the formalities to be followed in exercising them. Modem cor-
poration statutes, with increasing frequency, contain provisions requiring the corporation
to provide shareholders with this information. For example, § 262(b) (1) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law provides that the corporation must notify each shareholder en-
titled to appraisal rights, not less than 20 days prior to a meeting at which a proposed mer-
ger or consolidation is to be submitted for approval, that appraisal rights are available and
include a copy of § 262 of the statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1980). The 1981 revisions of the Delaware appraisal statute, referred to in note 140
supra, retain this requirement.
1m 28 Ky. LAw SuMM. 5, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1981) [hereinafter cited as KLS],
discretionary rev. granted sub nom. Strode v. Esmark, Inc. 622 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1981).
157 KRS §§ 292.560-.630 (1981).
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legislation in other jurisdictions has sometimes been successfully
challenged.
In November, 1977, Esmark, Inc. began making purchases
of stock in Reliance Universal, Inc., a Kentucky corporation,
aimed at gaining control of Reliance. 19 By August 13, 1979, Es-
mark's purchases exceeded five percent of the Reliance stock. 11
Ten days later, on August 23, 1979, Esmark first publicly an-
nounced its interest in acquiring Reliance.16 Esmark continued
systematic purchases of Reliance stock thereafter until, by Octo-
ber 23, 1979, Esmark had accummulated 233,700 shares of Reli-
ance stock, or approximately 11.45 percent of the outstanding
Reliance shares. 62 The Director of the Kentucky Division of Se-
curities brought suit in Franklin Circuit Court against Esmark
charging the company with seeking to acquire a controlling in-
terest in Reliance without complying with the provisions of the
Kentucky Take-Over Act. '6 The Franklin Circuit Court entered
judgment against Esmark, enjoining it from acquiring any fur-
ther Reliance stock and ordering Esmark to divest itself of all Re-
liance stock it had acquired in excess of five percent. Esmark
appealed. 6
The constitutionality of state takeover legislation has usually
been attacked either on the ground that such legislation violates
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,l1 or on
the ground that it violates the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
1 See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Idaho takeover law unconstitutional), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
159 28 KLS 5, at 1.
160 Id.
16 1 Id. Esmark filed a Schedule 13D as required by Regulation 13D (now Regulation
13D-G) promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Id. at 1 n.1. This was followed on August 27, 1979 by a report in The Wall Street
Journal as to Esmark's interest in acquiring Reliance. Id. at 1.
162 Id. at 1. These purchases had been made on the open market and through phon-
ing brokerage houses. Id.
163 Id. The Kentucky takeover statute provides that no offeror subject to the statute
shall make a takeover bid without complying with the provisions of the statute if, as the
result of the offer, the offeror will own more than 5% of any class of the target corpora-
tion's stock. KRS § 292.560 (1981).
4 28 KLS 5, at 1.
165 Id.
166 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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tion. 16 The argument directed at the commerce clause has been
customarily based on the extraterritorial effect of state takeover
laws and their resulting burden on interstate commerce.168 The
supremacy argument has been directed at the alleged conflict of
state takeover laws with federal regulation of corporate takeovers
under the Williams Act.19 The claim is made that, whereas Con-
gress in enacting the Williams Act sought to adopt a neutral posi-
tion as between an acquiring company and its target, 70 state leg-
islatures in enacting state takeover laws, with their prepublica-
tion provisions 7' and provisions for administrative hearings,7 2
are attempting to protect local interests by strengthening the
hands of the managements of target companies in their efforts to
thwart takeover attempts. 73
Discovering substantial evidence in the record to support the
finding of the trial court that the Kentucky takeover statute did
not conflict with the Williams Act or attempt to regulate inter-
state commerce, 74 the court of appeals in Esmark held that the
finding of the trial court regarding constitutionality should not
be set aside on appeal as erroneous. 7 On the supremacy issue the
court concluded that "Congress did not intend to preempt the en-
tire field of securities regulation so as to preclude the states from
entering the arena in order to protect its citizens from unfair
167 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
168 See Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Of-
Jers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974).
169 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
170 The Senate Committee Report which accompanied the Williams Bill stated:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of reg-
ulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full disclosure for the benefit of
investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1968).
171 See, e.g., KRS § 292.570(1) (1981) (requires person making a takeover bid to
publicize its terms at least 20 days prior to the making of the bid).
172 See, e.g., KRS § 292.570(1) (1981) (Director of Securities can order a hearing,
either upon his own initiative or upon request of the target company, to determine whe-
ther there has been full and fair disclosure of all material information).
173 See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687 (1975).
174 28 KLS5, at2.
175 Id.
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practices."'' 76 On the commerce clause issue, the court stated that
it found "substantial empirical evidence in the record to support
the trial court's finding that the various take-over statutes have
not interfered with interstate commerce or worked to preclude
an open-market approach to take-over bids."1'77 In fact, the court
said, "[t]he empirical evidence... tends to show that state
take-over statutes, rather than inhibiting or limiting the flow of
interstate commerce, have substantially enhanced this flow in
the form of additional premiums to the shareholders-the per-
sons whom the Williams Act was designed to protect."' 78
Although it upheld the constitutionality of the Kentucky
Take-Over Act, the court of appeals did disagree with the judg-
ment of the trial court as to ordering Esmark to divest itself of all
Reliance stock it had purchased in excess of five percent, since, in
the opinion of the court, the provisions of the Kentucky Securities
Act, of which the take-over statute is a part, only authorized in-
junctive relief. 7 Referring to specific language in these provi-
sions empowering the Director of the Division of Securities to
seek injunctive relief for violations of the statute, 11 the court said
176 Id. Support for this position can be found in § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which specifically preserves the jurisdiction of states over securities issues pro-
vided state action does not conflict with the provisions of the federal act. 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a) (1976).
177 28 KLS 5, at 2.
178 Id.
179 Id. The court considered two other contentions by Esmark regarding the judg-
ment against it. One concerned the jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts to consider the
case. The other concerned whether the Esmark purchases of Reliance stock constituted a
takeover bid under the Kentucky Take-Over Act. The court had no problem with jurisdic-
tion, pointing out that Esmark did a substantial business in Kentucky and that its activities
were such as to affect many Kentuckians in a substantial way. Id. at 1. As to Esmark's pur-
chases of Reliance stock, the court expressed the opinion that, while Esmark's purchases
prior to the announcement of its intention to acquire control of Reliance may not have vi-
olated the law, its systematic purchases thereafter would constitute a takeover bid under
the Kentucky Take-Over Act. Id. The court relied on the position taken by federal courts
that open market purchases made pursuant to a publicly announced buying program can
constitute a "tender offer" under § 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g.,
S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D.C. Mass. 1978).
180 The enforcement provisions of the Kentucky Securities Act provide:
Whenever it appears to the director that any person has engaged or is
about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provi-
sion of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, he may in his discretion
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin any such acts
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that they could not "discern a legislative intent on the part of the
General Assembly in enacting this statute to give the commis-
sioners the broad powers to require divestiture,"'' and that it
seemed to them that "the Kentucky Act would only permit the
court to enjoin Esmark from making further open-market pur-
chases and from making a take-over bid for Reliance shares until
the expiration of the waiting period" provided by the statute.182
Whether the position of the Kentucky Court of Appeals as to
the constitutionality of the Kentucky Take-Over Act will remain
intact remains to be seen.'- Ultimately, the constitutionality of
state takeover legislation will need to be resolved by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 4 One commentator has prophesied
that "[t]he Supreme Court can be expected to resolve these issues
in the near future and while prophecy is always dangerous, they
are likely to side with federal supremacy and preemption-but
probably on the narrowest possible grounds." ' ,
D. Registered Office
Another recent case of interest decided by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was Kern Manufacturing Corp. v. Kentucky
Gem Coal Co.,186 raising the question whether designation of a
registered office and agent as required by the Kentucky Business
Corporation Act' 87 is sufficient to confer venue in a suit brought
against the corporation. 85
or practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order
hereunder. Upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or writ of mandamus shall be granted and a receiver or
conservator may be appointed for the defendant or the defendant's assets.
The director may not be required to post a bond.
KRS § 292.470 (1981).
181 28 KLS 5, at 2.
182 Id.
183 The Supreme Court of Kentucky has granted a motion for discretionary review of
the Esmark case. Strode v. Esmark, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1981).
184The Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction in MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
486 (7th Cir. 1980); jurisdiction noted sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 451 U.S. 968
(1981) (Ilinois takeover statute).
185 Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State Regulation, and Preemp-
tion, 30 EMoay L.J. 35, 72 (1981).
186 610 S.W.2d 913 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
187 KRS § 271A.060 (1981).
188 The provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act pertaining to the main-
tenance of a registered office and registered agent state:
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In the Kern case, Kem Manufacturing Co. made a contract
in Clay County, Kentucky with Kentucky Gem Coal Co. to de-
liver certain goods to Kentucky Gem in Clay and Laurel Coun-
ties.189 Because of a dispute between the parties which arose as a
result of their business dealings, Kem brought a suit against Ken-
tucky Gem in Jefferson Circuit Court, where Kentucky Gem's
registered office and agent were located.'19 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint for lack of venue since the principal place
of business of Kentucky Gem was in Whitley County.' 91 Under
the Kentucky statutory provisions pertaining to venue in suits
brought against a corporation which has an office or place of
business in the state, the suit may be brought, among other pos-
sible choices, in the county in which such office or place of bus-
iness is situated.'92 The trial court determined that, since Ken-
tucky Gem maintained no office in Jefferson County other than
of its registered agent, the circumstances were insufficient to es-
tablish venue there. 9
3
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court. ,9 Noting that the provisions in the Kentucky Bus-
iness Corporation Act requiring every corporation to maintain a
registered office and agent and the provisions in the venue statute
were both designed to insure that corporations would be acces-
sible to litigation, the court of appeals concluded that it was "the
clear intent of the Legislature that a corporation may not defeat
venue in an action brought in the court in which its registered of-
fice and agent is located."'' 9- Referring to a previous decision by
Each corporation shall have and continuously maintain in this state:
(1) A registered office which may be, but need not be, the same as its
place of business; and
(2) A registered agent, which agent may be either an individual res-
ident in this state whose business office is identical with such registered of-
fice, or a domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation authorized to trans-
act business in this state, having a business office identical with such regis-
tered office.
Id.
189 610 S.W.2d at 913.
19Id.
19 Id.
192 KRS § 452.450 (1975).
193 610 S.W.2d at 913.
19 Id. at 914.
195 Id.
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the Supreme Court of Kentucky in which that Court had stressed
the importance of every person who deals with a corporation
knowing with certainty in what county legal action may be
brought against it, 196 the court of appeals remarked that "[t]he
importance of achieving this certainty in establishing where an
action may be brought... cannot be underestimated,"' 197 par-
ticularly in view of the abundance of corporations doing business
in the state.'98 As the court observed, "to allow the appellee [Ken-
tucky Gem] to prevail in this action would be to defeat the pur-
pose for which these statutes were promulgated."'9
196 Job Iron & Steel Co. v. Clark, 150 S.W. 367, 369 (Ky. 1912).
197 610 S.W.2d at 914.
198 Id. The court of appeals mentioned an earlier decision by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in Hill v. Cumberland Dairies, 288 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1956), in which the Court
had noted that the language of the venue statute referred to an office or place of business
rather than the chief office and had read the statutory language as contemplating "that the
corporation is doing business in the particular county to such an extent that it is actually
present there." 288 S.W.2d at 343. While the court of appeals said that the opinion in this
earlier Supreme Court case might suggest that some actual business would need to be con-
ducted in the county to establish venue, they did not feel that the case was controlling
since "the Court therein was not faced with a situation in which plaintiff was seeking to es-
tablish venue in the county in which the registered office and agent were located." 610
S.W.2d at 914.
199 610 S.W.2d at 914.
